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Richard: Florida Constitutional Law: Conveyance to a Tenancy by the Entire
CASE COMMENTS

FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CONVEYANCE TO A
TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY -THE
DEMISE OF THE "HEIRS' INTEREST" RATIONALE?
Jameson v. Jameson, 387 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1980)
Louis Jameson conveyed solely owned homestead property to his wife and
himself as tenants by the entirety., His wife did not join in the conveyance. 2
After Jameson's death, his son filed a declaratory action seeking to void the
conveyance, claiming it failed to satisfy Florida's constitutional joinder requirement.3 The trial court entered summary judgment for the plaintiff son,
and the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, construing the Florida Constitution to require joinder in all interspousal conveyances of homestead property.4 The court reasoned that such a construction was necessary to protect the
heirs' "constitutional rights" to the homestead property.5 On appeal, the Florida
supreme court reversed and HELD, the Florida Constitution does not require
joinder in an interspousal conveyance of solely owned homestead property to
the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety.6
It is generally recognized that property is freely alienable unless restricted
by law.7 Many states have historically restricted the alienation of homestead

1. 869 So. 2d 486, 436 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979). In 1974 Louis Jameson conveyed the homestead to himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety without his wife joining in the deed.
Subsequently, he and his wife reconveyed the property to Mr. Jameson. In 1977 Mr. Jameson
again conveyed the property without his wife's consent to himself and his wife as tenants by
the entirety.
2. Id.
8. Id. at 436-37. The action was brought against Mrs. Jameson. Both parties stipulated
that at the time of the two conveyances the property was homestead. Jameson's son, Edward,
claimed the 1974 and 1977 conveyances did not satisfy Florida's constitutional joinder requirements. FLA. CONsr. art. X, §4(c), which provides in part: "The owner of homestead real
estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale or gift
and, if married, may be deed transfer the title to an estate by the entirety with the spouse.'4. 869 So. 2d at 486-37. After voiding the conveyance, both courts had ordered that the
property descend according to FLA. STAT. §732A01 (1979), which provides that homestead
property descends like other property unless the decedent owner is survived by a spouse or
lineal descendants, in which case the surviving spouse takes a life estate and the lineal
descendants have a vested remainder in fee. 369 So. 2d at 437.
5. 369 So. 2d at 437. In reaching its decision, the third district court of appeal relied on
Williams v. Foerster, 35 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1976). See text accompanying notes 43-61 infra. The
court reasoned that the Supreme Court in Williams had implied that all conveyances of
solely-owned homestead property required joinder of husband and wife. Accordingly, the court
held FLA. STAT. §689.11 (1979), which allowed interspousal conveyance of homestead property
without joinder, unconstitutional to the extent it would have aliowed the instant conveyance.
369 So. 2d at 488. See generally Maines & Maines, Our Legal Chameleon Revisited: Florida's
HomesteadExemption, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 227 (1978).
6. 387 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1980). The court found joinder unnecessary to protect the heirs of
the homestead owner. Id. at 354.
7. Thomas v. Craft, 55 Fla. 842, 846, 46 So. 594, 596 (1908) (right to alienate an attribute
of ownership); Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 348, 22 So. 687, 692 (1897) (the right to alienate
is an inherent aspect of ownership). See Maines & Maines, supra note 5, at 265.
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property by requiring the owner's spouse to join in any conveyance. 8 Although
9
these joinder requirements are typically statutory, Florida has had such a
restriction on alienation in its constitution since 1868.10 The policy behind
homestead joinder requirements is protection of the wife and children from
improvident acts of the husband." Consequently, Florida courts construe the
joinder provisions liberally in favor of the wife and children.12
8. See 1 G. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY §943 (1924). Restrictions on homestead alienation were first construed to require the wife's consent in any conveyance of the
homestead. See, e.g., Swan v. Walden, 156 Cal. 195, 103 P. 931 (1909); Pritchett v. Davis, 101
Ga. 236, 28 S.E. 666 (1897); Shields v. Bush, 189 Ill. 534, 59 N.E. 962 (1901); Lessell v. Goodman, 97 Iowa 681, 66 N.W. 917 (1896); Hayes v. McAra, 166 Mich. 198, 131 N.W. 535 (1911);
McDonald v. Sanford, 88 Miss. 633, 41 So. 369 (1906); Sheridan First Nat'l Bank v. Citizens
State Bank, 11 Wyo. 32, 70 P. 726 (1902).
9. See, e.g., MICH. CoMsP. LiDws §14609 (1929); Miss. CODE ANN. §89-1-29 (1972); Wyo.
STAT. §34-53 (1957). See generally C. T EDEMAN, REAL PROPERTY §158 (1st ed. 1884).
Homestead acts are of American origin. While at common law certain items of a debtor
such as clothing were exempt from creditors, exemptions were first extended to real property
in America. Exemptions of real property from debts incurred prior to the grant of land was
provided for in the federal Homestead Act of 1862, 12 STAT. 392 (1862). This laid the basis
for state homestead exemption acts. See Maines & Maines, supra note 5, at 228.
Florida was one of the first states to pass a statute exempting items belonging to debtors,
Acts of March 15, 1843, §§1-2, Pamp. 55, reprinted in THOMPSON's DIGEsT 356 (1847). Items
such as bedding, kitchen wares and horses were exempt. See generally Shapo, Restraints on
Alienation and Devise of Homestead: Monsters Unfettered From Florida'sPast, 19 U. MIAMIs
L. REv. 72, 74 (1964).
10. See FLA. CONsT. art. IX, §1 (1868), superseded by, FLA. CONST. art. X, §§1, 4 (1885),
superseded by, FLA. CoNsT. art. X, §4. Homestead provisions in the 1868 constitution, FLA.
CONsT. art. IX (1868), provided that 160 acres of rural land or one-half acre of urban land,
and up to $1,000 of personal property, were exempt from creditors. Also, homestead property
could not be alienated unless (tone with joint consent of husband and wife. Further, all
exemptions were to accrue to the heirs of the homestead owner. The 1885 constitution significantly changed the homestead provisions. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §§2 & 4 (1885) provided that
the exemptions "inure to the widow and heirs of the party entitled to such exemption." Also,
it restricted devise of homestead property if the owner was survived by children. The restrictions on alienation remained substantially the same. The 1968 constitution changed the
joinder provisions. It required that a deed, mortgage, or gift of homestead be joined in by
husband and wife. But there was also a separate provision relating to conveyances to a
tenancy by the entirety, although it was not clear whether such conveyances required joinder.
FLA. CONsT. art. X, §4(c). Earlier joinder provisions had not referred separately to conveyance
to a tenancy by the entirety. See generally Note, Our Legal Chameleon is a Sacred Cow:
Alienation of Homestead under the 1968 Constitution, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 701 (1972).
11. See 1 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §247 (2d ed. 1920). The objective of the joinder
requirement was to enhance the protection afforded the family, by giving the wife a veto
power over the husband's acts affecting homestead property. This promoted the policy of
preventing a debtor's family from becoming destitute and, eventually, a charge of the state.
See Anderson v. Anderson, 44 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 1950) (Florida homestead provisions are
meant for the protection of the family). See generally 1 G. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY §909 (1924).
12. See, e.g., Patten Package Co. v. Houser, 102 Fla. 603, 136 So. 353 (1931) (exemption
should be liberally construed); Hill v. First Nat'l Bank of Marianna, 79 Fla. 391, 84 So. 190
(1920) (homestead provisions liberally construed in the interest of family home); Pasco v.
Hartley, 73 Fla. 819, 823, 75 So. 30, 32 (1917) (homesteads shall be construed in favor of wife
and children); Milton v. Milton, 63 Fla. 533, 58 So. 718 (1912) (homestead exemptions should
be liberally construed in favor of family home).
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The Florida Constitution of 1885 permitted the alienation of homestead
property, provided the conveyance was by deed or mortgage and "duly executed
. . . by husband and wife, if such a relationship exists."'13 Although interspousal conveyances were not directly addressed,1 4 the courts interpreted the
1885 constitution to require joinder in such transfers.-8 Two theories were
offered in support of this interpretation. One relied on a strict construction of
the constitution's language. 16 The other reasoned that joinder was necessary to
protect the property interests of the homestead owner's heirs in the homestead
17
property.
Thomas v. Craft,'8 decided in 1908, typifies the former approach. In
Thomas, the Florida supreme court first required joinder of the wife in an
interspousal conveyance of homestead property. The husband alone had conveyed solely owned homestead property to his wife and children.' 9 The children,
on reaching majority, sued for partition claiming their title was superior to that
of a subsequent purchaser. 20 Applying the 1885 joinder provisions strictly, the

supreme court invalidated the conveyance to the wife and children.1 The
18. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §4 (1885). The "duly executed" clause was strictly construed, thus,

many conveyances of homestead property made with joint consent of husband and wife were
found void on technical grounds. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151 (1920)
(deed not duly executed where wife acknowledges over the phone); Shad v. Smith, 74 Fla. 824,

76 So. 897 (1917) (deed signed but not acknowledged by wife insufficient to convey homestead);
Adams v. Malloy, 70 Fla. 491, 70 So. 463 (1915) (deed lacking wife's acknowledgment was void
although signed by husband and wife).

14. See FLA. CoNsT. art. X, §4 (1885) (did not distinguish between third-party and interspousal conveyances).
15. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151 (1920); Byrd v. Byrd, 78 Fla. 822,
74 So. 313 (1917); Thomas v. Craft, 55 Fla. 842, 46 So. 594 (1908).
16. The strict construction approach was first established in Thomas v. Craft, 55 Fla. 842,
46 So. 594 (1908). See text accompanying notes 18-22 infra.
17. The judicially created "heirs' interest" xationale originated in Rawlins v. Dade Lumber
Co., 80 Fla. 398, 86 So. 334 (1920). See Note, supra note 10, at 709.
The "heirs' interest" rationale introduced the additional requirement of consideration in
conveyances of homestead property. Courts invalidated homestead conveyances, otherwise
valid, if no valuable consideration had been given for the property. The courts reasoned the
valuable consideration replaced the homestead property and therefore the heirs' interests
were not detrimentally affected. See, e.g., Norman v. Kannon, 13 Fla. 710, 182 So. 903 (1988)
(consideration replaces homestead property thereby preserving the homestead exemptions);
Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla. 563, 107 So. 255 (1925) (consideration implicit constitutional requirement for conveyance of homestead property to the wife); Norton v. Baya, 88 Fla. 1, 102
So. 861 (1924) (conveyance of homestead required consideration). The doctrine of consideration was abandoned because the 1968 constitution provided, in part, that alienation of
homestead property by gift with the joint consent of husband and wife was valid. FLA. CONST.
art. X, §4(c).
18. 55 Fla. 842, 46 So. 594 (1908).
19. Id. at 844, 46 So. at 595.
20. Id. The plaintiffs were the Thomas' adopted children. Mr. Thomas conveyed the
homestead property to his iife and the plaintiffs, but his wife did not join in the conveyance.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs' and Mrs. Thomas' interests in the land were conveyed by Mr.
and Mrs Thomas to Julia Craft. The plaintiffs sued to have the conveyance to Julia Craft
voided. Id.
21. Id. at 846-47, 46 So. at 596. "The method by which the homestead shall be alienated
-i.e., conveyed or transferred -being expressly and specifically prescribed and-defined- in the
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court refused to distinguish between interspousal or interfamilial conveyances
and other conveyances of homestead, and concluded that no conveyance of
22
homestead was valid unless consented to by both husband and wife.
The supreme court abandoned its strict construction of the joinder provision in Rawlins v. Dade Lumber Co.23 In Rawlins, the husband alone conveyed homestead property to his wife in fee simple. The couple had no children. 24 Subsequent to the conveyance, the husband's creditors sued to have the
land sold to satisfy the husband's debts.25 In validating the conveyance, the
court rejected the argument that the constitution required joinder of the spouse
in all conveyances of homestead property. 26 Rather, the court reasoned that in
the absence of children the owner's wife was the sole prospective beneficiary
under the descent statutes.2 7 Since no prospective heirs' interests were adversely affected by the conveyance, it was a valid relinquishment of the husband's rights in favor of the sole beneficiary. 28 If there had been children, the

constitution to be by joint consent and by deed or mortgage duly executed by husband and
wife when that relation exists, all other methods of alienation are inhibited." Id.
22. Id., 46 So. at 595-96. The court cited McDonald v. Sanford, 88 Miss. 633, 41 So. 369
(1906), as its sole authority. McDonald involved a mortgage on homestead property given to a
third party without the wife's consent, and was unrelated to interspousal conveyances of
homestead. This indicates the lack of authority available to the court upon which to base its
decision. The court apparently disregarded numerous decisions in other jurisdictions which
distinguished interspousal and third-party conveyances of homestead property. See, e.g., Kindly
v. Spraker, 72 Ark. 228, 79 S.W. 766 (1904); Lynch v. Doran, 95 Mich. 395, 54 N.W. 882 (1893);
Bank of Bladen v. David, 53 Neb. 608, 74 N.W. 42 (1898); Hall v. Powell, 8 Okla. 276, 57 P.
168 (1899). Furthermore, the court ignored the intent of the joinder provision's drafters. They
intended to enable a wife to protect her family "in the possession and enjoyment of a homestead," rather than place obstacles in the way of interspousal conveyances. See Shapo, supra
note 10, at 87.
It is unclear why the supreme court chose to require joinder for interspousal conveyances
of homestead in contradiction to the weight of authority. Perhaps it wished to discourage
conveyances to wives, fearing that this would lead to breaks in the chain of descent. Cf. Note,
Estates by the Entirety: Creation Between Husband and Wife, I U. FLA. L. REv. 433, 436 n.18
(1948) (reasoning that property could not be directly conveyed from husband to husband and
wife as tenants by the entirety because courts feared the wife would eventually gain a fee
simple interest and thereby cause breaks in the chain of descent).
23. 80 Fla. 398, 86 So. 334 (1920). Rather than strictly construing the language of the
joinder provisions, the court shifted to a more functional approach. It noted the relationship
between grantor and grantee and considered what effects, if any, conveyance of the homestead
would have on the rights of the family members.
24. Id. at 399, 86 So. at 335.
25. Id.
26. Id. The husband's creditors argued that, regardless of the relationship between grantor
and grantee, the wife had not joined in the conveyance and it was therefore invalid.
27. Id. at 399, 86 So. at 336. The descent statute, FLA. GEN. STAT. §2297 (1906), provided
that if the homestead owner was survived by children, the wife could elect to take either
dower or the equivalent of a child's share in the property. If there were no children, the
homestead would descend to the wife and was not subject to devise by the husband. In
Rawlins the wife was the sole prospective beneficiary of the property because there were no
children involved.
28. 80 Fla. at 399, 86 So. at 334 (1920). If the court had followed its earlier strict construction approach, the conveyance would have been invalid regardless of the absence of
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conveyance would have been adverse to their interests and consequently invalid. 29 In developing this "heirs' interest" rationale, the court read the 1885
constitutional provision, which stated homestead exemptions shall "inure to
the widow and heirs," 80 together with the descent statute, which gave the homestead owner's heirs a vested interest in homestead property upon the owner's
death.31
Courts, in subsequent cases, were unable to define the nature of the heirs'
interest in the homestead property. 2 In one case, the supreme court reasoned
that the children, as prospective heirs, had a vested interest in homestead property prior to the owner's death.3 3 Applying the interest rationale test, the court
concluded that all interspousal conveyances which affected the heirs' vested
interests were prima fade invalid.3 ' The vested interest approach was abandoned in subsequent cases35 and the courts again attempted, without success,

children. In eschewing strict construction, the court denounced that approach and instead
developed the "heirs' interest" xationale.
29. Id. at 403, 86 So. at 336. The court reasoned that the children, as heirs of the head of
the family, had an interest in the homestead property. A conveyance to the wife without
joinder would be contrary to their interests because it would allow the wife's heirs to take the
property. Id.
30. F A. CONsT. art. X, §2 (1885). The constitution, neither stated nor suggested that the
homestead property inured to the widow and heirs.
31. F A. GEN. STAT. §2297 (1906). The court combined the descent statute and the constitutional "inure" clause to develop the theory that heirs had an interest in the property, as
opposed to an interest in the homestead exemptions. The children, as heirs, received an
interest in the property upon the owner's death. The court denominated this a present
interest in the property, constitutionally guaranteed by the "inure" clause.
The court, however, ignored two earlier cases which rejected the contention that children
had an interest in homestead property. See Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 22 So. 687 (1897)
(property rights in heirs not created by homestead exemption); Godwin v. King, 31 Fla. 525, 13
So. 108 (1893) (the "inure" clause does not create an estate in the heirs).
32. See, e.g., Norman v. Kannon, 133 Fla. 710, 182 So. 903 (1938) (consideration necessary
to preserve homestead exemption for protection of family); Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla. 563,
107 So. 255 (1925) (homestead property could not be conveyed without joint consent and consideration, otherwise the homestead owner's children, as prospective heirs, would be divested
of their constitutional rights in the property); Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 163, 84 So. 151
(1920) (the property is for the benefit of the heirs and the widow).
33. Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931).
34. Id. at 488, 136 So. 247. "We are of the opinion that a deed to a homestead, executed
either by the owner alone or jointly by the owner and his wife directly to the wife as grantee,
where there is a child or children living whether minors or adults, is prima facie ineffective to
convey legal title to such homestead in so far as the vested interests of the children are concerned" Id.
In an earlier case the court invalidated the use of a straw man conveyance without consideration to the wife. Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla. 563, 107 So. 255 (1925). Church and Jackson
effectively put an end to interspousal conveyances unless valuable consideration was exchanged
to replace the homestead property.
35. See Reed v. Fain, 145 So. 2d 858, 868 (Fla. 1962) (on rehearing) (heir's interest is not
vested); Scoville v. Scoville, 40 So. 2d 840, 842 (Fla. 1949) (existence or non-existence of
children, as prospective heirs, held irrelevant to the validity of homestead conveyances).
Accord, Florida Natl Bank v. Winn, 30 So. 2d 298, 300 (1942) (Terrell, J., dissenting) (the
exemption, not the homestead property, inures to the heirs).
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to define the nature of the heirs' interest in the homestead property. 86
In 1941, the Florida legislature enacted section 689.11, a curative statute
permitting interspousal conveyances without joinder by the grantee.3 7 The
statute did not explicitly refer to alienation of homestead property, however,
and the courts, relying on the "heirs' interest" rationale, continued to require
joinder in all interspousal conveyances of homestead property.38
In 1968, Florida revised the 1885 constitution and amended the homestead
alienation section to provide: "The owner of homestead real estate, joined by
the spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale or gift and,
if married, may by deed transfer the title to an estate by the entirety with the
spouse."' 9 The new provision deleted the requirement that husband and wife
join in a duly executed deed or mortgage.4 0 It was ambiguous, however, as to
whether the homestead owner alone could convey to a tenancy by the entirety. 41 The legislature apparently favored the latter interpretation, because in

36. See, e.g., Reed v. Fain, 145 So. 2d 858, 868 (Fla. 1962) (on rehearing) (the heirs interest is "incipient, dependent and contingent, yet genuine"); Robbins v. Robbins, 360 So. 2d 10
(2d D.C.A.) (heirs possess an inchoate interest), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1978); Moore v.
Moore, 237 So. 2d 217 (4th D.C.A.), (transfer to entirety without consent would abrogate heirs
inheritable rights in homestead property), cert. denied, 240 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1970).
37. 1941 Fla. Laws, Ch. 20954, §6. The effect of the statute was to abolish the requirement of unity of time, title, interest, and possession for a conveyance to a tenancy by the entirety. The statute validated all conveyances between husband and wife which would have
been effective had the parties not been married. Although it did not specifically refer to
homestead property, the statute implied that a husband could convey homestead property to
his wife without her joining in the deed.
In 1971, the statute was amended to specifically include homestead: "A conveyance of real
estate, including homestead, made by one spouse to the other shall convey legal title to the
grantee spouse in all cases in which it would be effectual if the parties were not married, and
the grantee need not execute the conveyance." FLA. STAT. §689.11(1) (1971) (the statute has
remained unchanged to date).
38. See, e.g., Estep v. Herring, 154 Fla. 653, 18 So. 2d 683 (1944) (deed invalid under
constitution notwithstanding statute); Moore v. Moore, 237 So. 2d 217 (4th D.C.A.) (statute
inapplicable to homestead because it would abrogate the heirs' inseritable rights to the
property), cert. denied, 240 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1970); Moorefield v. Byrne, 140 So. 2d 876 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1962) (statute inapplicable to homestead).
39. FLA. CoNsT. art. X, §4(c). See note 10 supra.
40. See FLA. CONsT. art. X, §4(c). The 1968 constitution's revisors also eliminated the
1885 constitutional requirement of joint consent by husband and wife in favor of a requirement that a homestead conveyance be joined in by the spouse. This modification reflects a
flexible attitude toward the joinder restrictions in contrast to the strict interpretation of the
courts. Also, by removing the "duly executed" clause, the revisors effectively nullified the line
of cases which required strict adherence to formal rules of conveyancing homestead property.
See, e.g., Wickes Lumber Co. v. Moxley, 342 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977). See note 13 supra.
41. The ambiguity concerned whether the "joined by spouse" clause also modified the
clause dealing with a transfer of homestead to a tenancy by the entirety.
Under the 1885 constitution, joinder was required for all conveyances of homestead property which would affect the heirs' interests in the property. See note 32 supra. The same
interpretation might have been given to the 1968 constitutional joinder provisions. Commentators, however, felt the 1968 joinder provisions did not require joinder for interspousal
conveyances. See, e.g., Maines & Maines, supra note 5, at 242; Note, supra note 10, at 707. But
see 1 R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL EsrA TE NSAcrTIONS §22.02 (1969).
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1971 section 689.11 was amended to specifically authorize interspousal con-

42
veyances of homestead property without joinder by the grantee.

In Williams v. Foerster,43 the constitutionality of section 689.11 was chal-

lenged regarding its application to homestead conveyances made prior to the
1968 constitutional revision. 44 In Williams, the husband alone conveyed to his
wife his interest in homestead property held as a tenancy by the entirety.45 The

supreme court rejected the argument that section 689.11 was unconstitutional
to the extent it would allow such a conveyance. 46 Instead, the court avoided the

constitutional joinder issue by concluding that homestead alienation restrictions did not apply to homestead held as an entirety.47 Because the property
was held as a tenancy by the entirety, the surviving spouse would take the
property regardless of the owner's children's interests. 48 Consequently, the court
reasoned that the owner's children had no interest in the property and joinder
was not necessary to protect the prospective heirs.49 In distinguishing solely
owned from non-solely owned homestead property, the court implicitly affirmed the notion that prospective heirs had an interest in solely owned homestead property under the 1885 constitution.5 0 The question left unanswered was
42.

FLA. STAT. §689.11 (1971). See note 37 supra.
43. 335 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1976).
44. The conveyance in question was made prior to 1968 so the 1885 constitutional joinder
provisions applied. Section 689.11 of the Florida Statutes was relevant because it provided that
direct interspousal conveyances made prior to 1971 were validated if they would have been
effectual between unmarried parties. FLA. STAT. §689.11(2) (1971). The court analyzed the
constitutionality of the statute under both the 1885 and 1968 constitutions. 335 So. 2d at 812.
45. Id. The husband and wife held the homestead property as a tenancy by the entirety.
During a marital dispute, the husband, acting alone, conveyed his interest in the entirety to
his wife, giving her a fee simple estate. The husband subsequently challenged the validity of
that conveyance because his wife had not joined in the deed. His wife contended FLA. STAT.
§689.11(2) (1971) retroactively validated homestead conveyances made without joinder prior
to 1971. 335 So. 2d at 812. The lower court, agreeing with the husband, found the statute unconstitutional to the extent it would have validated the conveyance in question. It also found
the statute in conflict with the 1968 joinder clause because that provision carried the same
meaning as the 1885 version. Foerster v. Foerster, 300 So. 2d 33 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1974).
46. 335 So. 2d at 812. Although it held the statute constitutional, the court invalidated
the conveyance by finding the husband lacked the requisite intent to make a binding conveyance. Id.
47. Id. The court held FA. STAT. §689.11 (1971) was not in conflict with either the 1885 or
1968 constitution insofar as it validated the conveyance. It relied on Denham v. Sexton, 48
So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1950), which held the 1885 joinder provision inapplicable to non-solely owned
homestead property. This suggested that the joinder provisions of the 1885 and 1968 constitutions placed identical restrictions on homestead alienation. See text accompanying note 64
infra.
48. 335 So. 2d at 812. Property held as an entirety automatically vests in the surviving
spouse upon the death of the other. The surviving spouse takes the property in fee simple,
notwithstanding its former homestead status. Therefore, the heirs of the husband in the
principal case had neither claim to nor interest in the homestead property. See generally
Note, supTra note 22.
49. 335 So. 2d at 812.
50. Id. Non-solely owned property was not subject to the 1885 homestead joinder requirements because the children of the property owner are not prospective heirs of the
property. Solely-owned property, to which the children were prospective heirs, was subject to
the homestead restrictions. Therefore, whether property was subject to the homestead
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whether the same interpretation would be given the 1968 homestead alienation
provision. 5 7

In the instant case, the supreme court did not directly address the issue of
whether the owner's heirs had an interest in homestead property. The court did
recognize that the instant conveyance would have been invalid under the 1885
joinder provisions as construed in prior cases. 52 It reasoned, however, that the

modified language of the 1968 joinder provision required a different interpreta5 4
tion.53 Accordingly, the court validated the conveyance.

The court, in addressing the ambiguity of the 1968 joinder provision, found
the language expressive of two separate concepts. 55 First, a married homestead
owner may alienate the homestead property provided there is spousal consent. 56
Second, a homestead owner may convey the homestead to a tenancy by the
entirety without spousal consent.5 7 To support the latter conclusion, the court
cited several legislative and legal articles which advocated this interpretation. 58
The cited articles found previous cases requiring joinder unpersuasive, because
they had been based on the fallacious belief that the owner's heirs had constitualienation restriction turned on whether the owner's children might have been beneficiaries
of the property upon the owner's death. This suggests that the homestead provisions were
construed as if designed to protect the interests of prospective heirs. By using the solely-owned,
non-solely owned distinction, the Williams court appeared to affirm the "heirs' interest"
interpretation of the 1885 joinder requirement and suggested that the same interpretation
would apply to the 1968 provisions.
51. The answer to the question could be found by either of two approaches. The court
could follow its prior decisions and require joinder for all homestead conveyances which
would affect the prospective heirs' interests. See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra. Alternatively, it could adopt the viewpoint of commentators by refusing to require joinder and
discarding the "heirs' interest" rationale. See, e.g., Maines & Maines, supra note 5, at 265; Note,
supra note 10, at 710.
52. 387 So. 2d at 351. The court cited Byrd v. Byrd, 73 Fla. 322, 74 So. 313 (1917). Byrd
was decided using the strict construction approach. Noticeably absent from the brief opinion
were any cases using the "heirs' interest" rationale.
53. 387 So. 2d at 351. The court focused on the language of the 1968 joinder provisions.
It did not discuss what interests the plaintiff, as prospective heir under FLA. STAT. §732A01
(1979), had in the homestead property. This was similar to the literal approach first taken by
courts construing the 1885 joinder provisions. See note 21 supra.
However, the court also utilized a policy analysis in construing the 1968 joinder provision
as not requiring joinder in the instant conveyance. The court concluded that requiring
joinder would not further homestead policy. 387 So. 2d at 354.
54. 387 So. 2d at 354.
55. Id.
56. Id. See note 10 supra.
57. Id. This determination of two separate meanings was logical. The joinder restrictions
modified the clause referring to conveyances of homestead by deed, mortgage, or gift and was
separate from the clause concerning transfers of homestead to a tenancy by the entirety. See
FLA. CONsr. art. X, §4(c). See generally Note, supra note 10, at 707.
58. 887 So. 2d at 353. The court quoted Star Project Commentary, Background Papers of
1978 Constitution Revision Commission, Record Group 5, Series 263, Box 3, Florida State
Archives [hereinafter cited as Star Project], which had concluded that "where homestead
property is conveyed from a sole owner, not to a third party, but to the owner's spouse in fee
simple, or where the sole owner seeks to transfer to an estate by the entireties with the spouse,
the present language may be read so as to eliminate the requirement for the signature of the
non-owning spouse."
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tionally protected interests in the homestead property. 59 Noticeably, the court
was silent on the "heirs' interest" theory. Instead, it abruptly stated that joinder
in the instant conveyance would not enhance protection of the heirs.60 Accordingly, it found requiring joinder in the instant conveyance irrational and
unnecessary.6 '
The court held, on alternative grounds, that the grantee spouse had joined
in the homestead alienation by acquiescing to the conveyance. 62 This approach
was possible because the 1968 joinder provisions no longer required the conveyance to be "duly executed" by both spouses. 62

The court next reconciled its decision with the Williams case. In Williams,
the court had implied that the 1885 and 1968 joinder provisions placed identical
restrictions on homestead alienation.64 The instant court, however, said the
Williams holding merely found that the 1885 and 1968 joinder provisions
treated non-solely owned homestead property in the same manner. 65 Accordingly, Williams did not suggest that the 1885 and 1968 joinder provisions
treated solely owned homestead similarly. 66 Finally, given its construction of the
1968 joinder provision,67 the court found section 689.1168 compatible with the
1968 constitution.6 9
Although the instant court did not expressly reject the "heirs' interest"
rationale, such a rejection is implicit in the court's holding. If the heirs had an
interest in the property, the court would have required joinder to protect those
interests. 70 Apparently, the court recognized that homestead exemptions, rather
59. See Note, supra note 10, at 708; Maines &Maines, supra note 5, at 269.
60. 387 So. 2d at 354. The court did not discuss the nature of the prospective heirs interest in the property or when joinder was necessary to protect those interests. This cryptic result leaves unanswered what the heirs are being protected from, the improvident acts of the
homestead owner or acts which would contravene the heirs' interest in the homestead property.
61.

Id.

'62. Id. The grantee spouse's acceptance of the conveyance signified an implicit joinder in
the deed by acquiescence, although formal execution was lacking. Id. (noting Star Project,
supranote 58).
63. Under the 1885 joinder provisions, the acquiescence theory was not viable because the
instrument had to be "duly executed." FLA. CONST. art. X, §4 (1885). See note 13 supra. However, the 1968 joinder provision did not require that husband and wife join in an executed
instrument. FA. CONsr. art. X, §4(c). Therefore, the acquiescence theory was viable.
The use of the acquiescence theory as an alternative decisional basis in the instant case
makes the decision difficult to fully understand. Theoretically, joinder is still required under
the acquiescence rationale. The instant case can be read to require joinder for an interspousal conveyance of homestead property, with the exception of a conveyance to a tenancy
by the entirety where joinder is satisfied by acquiescence.
64. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
65. 887 So. 2d at 854. See note 47 supra.
66. 887 So. 2d at 854. The lower court read Williams to imply that the 1885 and 1968
joinder provisions were identical with regard to joinder. It concluded, therefore, that the
conveyance without joinder was in conflict with the 1968 joinder provisions. 369 So. 2d at 488.
67. 387 So. 2d at 854.
68. FLA.STAT. §689.11 (1979).
69. 887 So. 2d at 854.
70. When Mr. Jameson conveyed the homestead to himself and his wife as tenants by the
entirety, he gave his wife the right to take the property in fee simple upon his death. That
would terminate any interest of Mr. Jameson's children in the property.
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than homestead property interests, inure to the heirs. That recognition, although inconsistent with prior case law, 7 1 accords with both the constitution's

73
language72 and the opinion of most commentators.
The "heirs' interest" rationale developed from a misconception about the
relationship between the constitution's inure clause and the statutory descent
restrictions on homestead. Although the inure clause and the descent restrictions were clearly distinct, 74 the courts commingled them to develop the "heirs'
interest" rationale and, at one time, to find a vested property estate in favor of
heirs. 75 This judicial invention had little basis in either law or policy.
In developing the "heirs interest" rationale, courts failed to recognize that,
as a matter of policy, homestead joinder requirements existed to enable the
wife to protect the family from the improvident acts of the homestead owner. 76
An interspousal conveyance to a tenancy by the entirety is not an improvident
act. The property remains in the family, and cannot be alienated unless husband and wife consent. Further, it may acquire homestead status even though
held as a tenancy by the entirety7 7 The policy behind homestead joinder re-

Had the court recognized the "heirs' interest" rationale, it would have invalidated the
conveyance as inimical to the heirs' interest in the homestead property. By validating the
instant conveyance, the court implicitly rejected the "heirs' interest" rationale.
71. See notes 29-32 supra.
72. FLA. CONST. art. X, §4(b) provides: "These (homestead) exemptions shall inure to the
surviving spouse or heirs of the owner." The 1885 inure clause, FLA. CONST. art. X, §2 (1885)
provided that "the" exemptions inured to the widow and heirs of the owner. By changing
"the" to "these", the revisors seemed to imply that the 1968 inure clause applied only to
the exemptions listed in the constitution; whereas the 1885 inure clause had been held to
include restrictions on the descent of homestead found in statutory law. Whatever the revision intended, the 1968 constitution nowhere states that the homestead property inures to
the heirs.
73. E.g., Note, supra note 10, at 703; Maines & Maines, supra note 5, at 269.
74. The inure clause is found in the constitution; the descent restriction is statutory. The
constitution states that exemptions will inure to the surviving spouse and heirs, without
enumerating benefits which may or may not accrue due to restrictions on homestead descent.
The 1885 constitution, FLA. CONST. art. X, §1 (1885), provided that the homestead would
be exempt from forced sale and that no judgment would encumber the property unless it
was for unpaid taxes or an obligation incurred in obtaining or improving the property. Those
were the exemptions which inured to the heirs, rather than some undefinable interest derived
from the descent restrictions on homestead. FLA. GEN. STAT. §2297 (1906). See note 31 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 27-34.
76. See note 11 supra.
77. See Moxley v. Wickes Corp., 356 So. 2d 785, 785 n.l (Fla. 1978); Harkins v. Holt, 124
Fla. 774, 169 So. 481 (1936); Cf. Anemaet v. Martin-Senour, 114 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1959) (constitution does not specify which estates can acquire homestead status). But cf.
Kinney v. Mosher, 100 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1958) (descent restrictions on homestead
property cannot apply to property held as a tenancy by the entirety). The Florida Constitution
requires that property be owned by the head of the family before it becomes homestead. FLA.
CONST. art. X, §4(a). A wife may acquire this status upon the death of her husband (assuming
he was the head of the family) or the husband on the death of his wife (assuming she was the
head of the family). See Regero v. Daugherty, 69 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1953); Anderson v. Anderson,
44 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1950). See generally Comment, Homestead: Family Headship, 7 U. FLA.
L. REv. 102 (1954). Therefore, the issue of family headship does not threaten the property's
homestead status and consequently joinder should not be required.
Perhaps the only problem with homestead property held as a tenancy by the entirety is
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quirements is not protection of constitutionally guaranteed heirs' interests in
the homestead property. Therefore, the court correctly omitted the "heirs'
interest" rationale from its analysis of the instant conveyance.
The instant case could be logically extended to eliminate the joinder requirement in a direct interspousal conveyance of a fee simple interest in solely
owned homestead property.78 While as a practical matter such conveyance can
now be accomplished without joinder, two transactions are required. The
homestead owner may convey homestead property to a tenancy by the entirety
and then relinquish his interest in the entirety, thereby creating a fee simple
interest in favor of the holding spouse. Under recent cases, neither the conveyance nor the relinquishment would require joinder.79 It is illogical to allow
circuitous conveyance without joinder, while disallowing a direct conveyance
without joinder.
The decision in the instant case was also sound from a practical standpoint.
It was consistent with the legislative position on interspousal homestead
alienations 0 Also, homestead conveyances to the spouse can now be made
quickly and easily, without defeating the grantor's intention.S1 Finally, the
decision allows practitioners to rely on section 689.11, something they had generally declined to do absent judicial resolution of potential constitutional
82
challenges under the 1968 joinder provisions.
By refusing to employ the "heirs' interest" rationale as an analytical tool
in the instant case, the supreme court partially retired a misconceived and misused judicial theory. Hopefully, the supreme court will completely abandon the
"heirs' interest" rationale by eliminating the joinder requirement in all interspousal conveyances of homestead property.8 3 That would more equitably
reconcile free alienation and constitutional homestead policies, matters distinct
that upon divorce it becomes a tenancy in common, subject to the claims of both ex-spouses.
However, courts have not allowed the homestead to be partitioned if it would be detrimental
to the residing family members. See, e.g., Barnett Bank v. Osborne, 349 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 4th
D.CA. 1977) (wife allowed to retain possession with homestead status until children reached
age 18); Daniels v. Katz, 237 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 8d D.CA. 1970) (husband could not encumber
property while children and ex-wife resided there and wife was legally responsible for children); Radford v. Radford, 117 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1960) (tenancy in common could
not be partitioned Where wife granted exclusive use and possession in decree). See generally
Murray, Family Law, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1069 (1978).
78. There are.suggestions in the instant case that no interspousal conveyances of homestead property require joinder. See 387 So. 2d at 353. However, the holding was limited to
consideration of joinder for an interspousal conveyance to a tenancy by the entirety.
79. The holding in the instant case would allow the first conveyance without joinder. The
relinquishment of interest could be accomplished without joinder under Williams v. Foerster,
335 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1976). See notes 44-50 and accompanying text, supra.
80. The legislature would not have amended §689.11 to include homestead if it believed
that the 1968 provisions required joinder in an interspousal conveyance of homestead property.
81. Generally, courts have invalidated interspousal conveyances of homestead, frustrating
the owning spouse's intention to convey an interest to the non-owning spouse.
82. Ch. 71-54 LAwYER's Trr=x GuARANTY FUND, TN 16.02.04 (1977). The Fund recommended that lawyers continue to have both spouses join in any conveyance of homestead
property until §689.11 was tested in the courts.
83. See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1981

11

